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Japan’s Defensive Constitution

JAPAN’S DEFENSIVE CONSTITUTION: NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A BETTER ALTERNATIVE THAN
EXPANDING COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES
Joshua Pickar1
I.

INTRODUCTION
After World War II, the United States effectively rewrote the Japanese Constitution. This

Constitution, which is still in effect, includes many provisions similar to those included in the United
States Constitution.2 However, other articles seek to ensure that Japan would not engage in acts of
aggression similar to those it undertook during the course of the war. 3 This includes an ultimate
prohibition, renouncing Japan’s sovereign right as a nation to engage in war.4 The Constitution
includes explicit references to pacifism in both the preamble and in Article 9. The preamble states,
“We, the Japanese people . . . resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war
through the action of the government.”5 The preamble continues, “We . . . desire peace for all time
. . . and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of
the peace-loving peoples of the world.”6 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution also references
Japan’s pacifist status: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of

1

The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs, BA 2014; The
University of Chicago Law School, JD 2017.
2
Compare, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”); with NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 21 (Japan) (“Freedom of
assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.
No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be
violated.”).
3
KENPŌ, supra note 2, pmbl., art. 9.
4
Id. art. 9.
5
Id. pmbl.
6
Id.

Joshua Pickar
Japan’s Defensive Constitution

force as means of settling international disputes.”7 Article 9 continues: “In order to accomplish [this
goal] . . . land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”8 This Article has been the center of debate and
controversy since its inception, and these debates recently came to a head when Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe attempted to unilaterally reinterpret the Article in order to allow the standing military,
which until now functioned only domestically, to engage in collective self-defense.9
This new interpretation has been the subject of mass demonstrations and public backlash,
including one of the few instances of widespread student protests and civil unrest in modern
Japanese history.10 Only 29% of respondents in a public opinion poll supported this change in
constitutional interpretation, and 55% expressly opposed the change.11 Professor Matsumoto Masao,
who conducted the study, concluded, “Japanese people still feel a strong resistance to approving the
roles [sic] of the military for peace. In that sense, Japanese opinion about security has not changed
significantly [since WWII].”12 Yet, in surveys where respondents had the option to choose whether
Japan should be able to exercise the full right to self-defense, whether it should exercise the right to
a limited extent, or whether it should not exercise the right at all, a large proportion opined that
Japan should be able to exercise the right to self-defense in a limited capacity.13

7

Id. art. 9.
Id.
9
See e.g., Odaka Chiba & Takuro Negishi, 700 sue Japan over security laws, additional suits planned, THE
ASAHI SHIMBUN (Apr. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/2LQF-9UX8.
10
See e.g., Jiji Kyodo, SEALDS-led protests return to Diet as security legislation takes effect, THE JAPAN TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y6CT-S7QG; Spotlight: Japan’s security laws come into effect as public
protests erupt, opposition seeks laws’ scrapping, XINHUA (Mar. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/YLE3-R2L2;
Jiji Kyodo, New opposition party expected to push constitutional change without prioritizing Article 9, THE JAPAN
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/YK7G-9UFC.
11
Kamika Matake, Japanese Public Opinions about the Exercise of the Right of Collective Self-Defense, JAPAN
FOREIGN POLICY FORUM (Sept. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/8AFA-3ZLK.
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Id.
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8

2

Joshua Pickar
Japan’s Defensive Constitution

Japan faces a dilemma: the current administration has legitimate security fears given
increasing interactions between Japan and the rest of the world, while civilians, deeply scarred as the
only people in history to be attacked by nuclear weapons, want Japan to maintain its pacifist roots.
The crux of the citizens’ concern is that the government will become too internationally entangled.14
Therefore, I would argue that, in order to resolve these competing interests, Japan should acquire
defensive nuclear weapons in order to quell the security concerns of the government while responding
to the cries from the citizenry to remain pacifist. While acquisition of nuclear weapons may breach
Japan’s duties under international law, other countries may acquiesce, particularly the United States,
as such proliferation will help to lessen the financial burden on the U.S., who currently provides for
Japan’s defense. Other similarly situated nations, like the members of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), may acquiesce as well given NATO’s desire to expand into Asia, which may
allow Japan to proceed without repercussions for its violations of international law. The following
discusses the history of the Japanese Constitution as well as the role of nuclear weapons in
international politics, and argues that defensive nuclear weapons are the most effective way for
Japan to obtain its desired result while maintaining a pacifist foreign policy to avoid citizen outrage.
II.

HISTORY OF JAPAN’S CONSTITUTION, RENUNCIATION OF WAR, AND THE
LOGIC OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
a.

History of the Japanese Constitution and Japan’s Renunciation of War

The modern Japanese Constitution came into effect at the end of World War II on May 3,
1947.15 In 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, while in charge of the provisional government of
Japan, began drafting a new Constitution effectuating the demands of the victorious allies.16 General

14

See supra notes 9–11.
See Sandra Madsen, The Japanese Constitution and Self-Defense Forces: Prospects for a New Japanese Military
Role, 3 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 549, 556 (1993).
16
Id.
15
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MacArthur intended for this to be a peaceful Constitution, replacing the Meiji Constitution.17 The
preamble to the Constitution sets out this goal: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based
on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.”18 Other less explicit
provisions demonstrate the peaceful goal as well. For example, Article 66 requires that government
leaders be civilians,19 and the Constitution lacks a provision granting citizens the right to bear arms
or to form a peacetime militia.20
The goal of creating a peaceful Constitution is not new in world history. Indeed, the
constitutions of countries like France, Brazil, and the Philippines renounce aggressive war.21 Yet, the
complete renunciation of all “war potential” is an outlier in the history of comparative constitutional
inquiry, rendering analysis of Article 9 to be a novel endeavor. 22
The story of the Japanese ability to engage in collective self-defense starts with the U.S.
signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan,23 and the Security Treaty Between the United States of
America and Japan.24 According to the Peace Treaty, “Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations and . . . Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.”25
Similarly, in the Security Treaty, the U.S. agreed to maintain armed forces in Japan to deter attacks
against Japan “in the expectation . . . that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its

17

Id. at 553–54.
KENPŌ, supra note 2, art. 9.
19
Id. art. 66.
20
See John M. Maki, The Constitution of Japan: Pacifism, Popular Sovereignty, and Fundamental Human Rights,
53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 73–74 (1990).
21
See Madsen, supra note 15, at 553–54.
22
Id.
23
Japan-U.S., Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169 [hereinafter Peace Treaty].
24
Japan-U.S., Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3329 [hereinafter Security Treaty].
25
Peace Treaty, supra note 23, 3 U.S.T. 3169, at art. 5(c).
18
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own defense against direct and indirect aggression.”26 Therefore, at least as far as the international
sphere is concerned, Japan could engage in collective self-defense both as understood under the
U.N. Charter, and under Japan’s various peace and security treaties with other nations.
b.

Japanese Court and Political Decisions Regarding Article 9
i.

Japanese judicial decisions of Article 9 and the right to self-defense

While Japanese courts have not extensively interpreted Article 9, the few court decisions
available illuminate the modern understanding of Japan’s renunciation of war and Japan’s right to
self-defense. A consistent issue related to the reinterpretation of Article 9 is whether the existence of
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the unified military forces of Japan, violates Article 9. By
way of background, the Korean Conflict began while General MacArthur was drafting the
Constitution, and the U.S. moved its troops that were based in Japan into Korea, leaving Japan
defenseless.27 MacArthur ordered Japan to create a National Police Reserve (NPR) of 75,000 armed
men.28 In 1952, Japan signed its Peace and Defense Treaties with the U.S., recognizing Japan’s
inherent right to self-defense.29 The NPR included former Imperial Japanese Army soldiers,
classified as policemen.30 In 1954, the Japanese Diet, the equivalent of the American congress,
passed the Defense Agency Establishment Law, which created the current Self-Defense Forces.31
The SDF quickly grew in response to Cold War threats in Asia, amassing air, sea, and land forces of
approximately 300,000 personnel and expending $30 billion in 1990.32 Japan spent the third most on
military in Asia, and is the second-largest contributor to the budget of the United Nations.33
26

Security Treaty, supra note 24, 3 U.S.T. 3329, at pmbl., 5th para.
See Madsen, supra note 15, at 557.
28
Id.
29
Id.; see infra § II(b)(ii).
30
Madsen, supra note 15, at 558.
31
Id. at 558 (citing Defense Agency Establishment Law, reprinted in HARRISON M. HOLLAND,
MANAGING DEFENSE: JAPAN’S DILEMMA app. B 71, 73 (1988)).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 558–59.
27
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Given that the Japanese Constitution forbids Japan from possessing “war potential,” some
scholars and political parties argue that this precludes Japan from possessing forces such as the
SDF.34 The government argues that, because Article 9 has no effect on the state’s inherent right of
self-defense, the creation of standing forces for that purpose does not constitute “war potential” as
prohibited by Article 9. “War potential” would require significantly larger forces than the SDF.35
While the Supreme Court of Japan never conclusively opined on the legality of the SDF, it
confronted related questions. In the 1952 case, Keisatu yobitai iken soshō (the Constitutionality of the
National Police Reserve),36 a member of the Diet filed suit alleging that the NPR was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court dismissed the case on a standing challenge,37 arguing that the Court could not
determine the constitutionality of a law in such an abstract manner without an actual legal dispute.38
The Court later spoke about the interpretation of Article 9 in several cases, but never considered the
constitutionality of the SDF in its judgments.39
34

See e.g., Lawrence W. Beer, Peace in Theory and Practice under Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 815, 821–22 (1998) (“Until 1994 . . . the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan . . . consistently
maintained that the SDF were unconstitutional.”).
35
LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Japan: Interpretations of Article 9 of the Constitution 3 n.19 (Sept. 2015),
https://perma.cc/C8UU-6XWZ (citing Answer of Ichiro Yoshikuni before the Budget Committee
of the House of Councillors, Nov. 13, 1972, SANGIIN YOSAN IIN KAIGIROKU [BUDGET COMMITTEE
OF HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS MINUTES], 70th Diet Session, No. 5, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1972)). See infra
§ II(b)(ii) (discussing the government’s position on the scope and effect of Article 9).
36
See D. Bradley Gibbs, Future Relations Between the United States and Japan: Article 9 and the
Remilitarization of Japan, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 137, 147–48 n.63 (2010) (citing Saikō Saibansho [Sup.
Ct.] Oct. 8, 1952, 6 SAIKŪ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 9 (Japan)).
37
In American law, courts only hear cases when parties have proper “standing” before the court.
U.S. Const. art. 3 § 2 cl. 1 (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [and] Controversies.”).
The cases or controversies requirement necessitates that litigants have an actual conflict for the
court to resolve—federal courts will not resolve abstract questions of law nor issue advisory
opinions. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 216–19 (2011) (discussing the standing
requirement in American law); see also Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing:
A Proposed Solution to the Serious (But Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV 1373,
1378–84 (2014) (same).
38
Gibbs, supra note 36, at 147–48 n.63.
39
See e.g., LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 18 n.122 (citing Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
June 20, 1989, 43 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISUHŪ [MINSHŪ] 6 (Japan); and Niigata Chihō
Saibansho [Niigata Dist. Ct.] Mar. 27, 1981, 13 KEIJI SAIBAN GEPPŌ KONISHI 3, 251 (Japan)). See also
6
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One case from the Sapporo District Court (the trial court) held that the SDF was
unconstitutional.40 However, the Sapporo High Court (the appellate body) reversed this decision on
technical grounds, and the Supreme Court affirmed.41 The Sapporo High Court stated that the
constitutionality of the SDF was a question that would forever evade judicial review, essentially
employing the American political question doctrine:42 “The choice of means of defense is nothing
other than a determination of the most fundamental national policy, requiring both a high level of
specialized technical judgment and a high level of political judgment.”43
Perhaps the only case to recognize Japan’s inherent right to self-defense was the Sunakawa
case,44 in which the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of U.S. forces stationed in Japan.
The Supreme Court noted that Article 9, “[R]enounces the so-called war and prohibits the
maintenance of the so-called war potential, but certainly there is nothing in [Article 9] which would
deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism advocated
in our Constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or nonresistance.”45 Further, the
Court recognized that, “Article 9 . . . does not at all prohibit our country from seeking a guarantee

Robert B. Funk, Japan’s Constitution and U.N. Obligations in the Persian Gulf War: A Case for Non-Military
Participation in U.N. Enforcement Actions, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 363, 378–79 (1992) (“Japan’s Supreme
Court has repeatedly dodged and implicitly rejected challenges that the SDF is unconstitutional.”).
40
Sapporo Chihō Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Aug. 7, 1973, 712 HANREI JIHŌ 24 (Japan), translation
available in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN 83 (Beer & Itoh, eds., 1996); see LAW
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 83.
41
Sapporo Kōtō Saibansho [Sapporo High Ct.] Aug. 5, 1976, 821 HANREI JIHŌ 21 (Japan), translation
available in Beer & Itoh, supra note 40, at 118.
42
The political question doctrine is an abstention principle in American law allowing for courts to
forego judgement on cases that are fundamentally political, and not legal, in nature, where such a
determination would be better suited for a coordinate branch of government than the judiciary. See
generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217–18 (1962); see also Jared P. Cole, The Political Question
Doctrine: Justiciability and the Separation of Powers, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Dec. 23, 2014),
https://perma.cc/8QY2-UKB9.
43
Id. at 118.
44
See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Showa 34(A) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO
HANREISHŪ 3225 (Japan), https://perma.cc/U397-DKAG.
45
Id.
7
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from another country in order to maintain the peace and security of the country.”46 Because the U.S.
troops were foreign, their presence did not implicate the “war potential” of Japan. Ultimately,
judicial decisions considering the scope of Japan’s renunciation of war are not dispositive, as such a
determination seems more political than judicial.
ii.

Political interpretations of Article 9 and the right to self-defense

While Japanese judicial decisions considering the constitutionality of the SDF and Japan’s
renunciation of war are far from conclusive, various political decisions and speeches clearly set out
the government’s understanding of Article 9. Generally, scholars and politicians interpret the
renunciation of war “as a means for settling international disputes” to prohibit only affirmative
invasions of other countries.47 Some scholars do argue that this prohibition precludes defensive
operations as well,48 because 1) all wars, including defensive wars, are a “means of settling
international disputes,” and 2) it is difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive
invasions.49 However, such a view has never taken hold.50 Importantly, unlike Article 9, the preamble
to the Constitution has no binding legal effect, despite its clear pacifist message.51
From early on, Japanese politicians and administrations interpreted Article 9 of the
constitution. For example, Kumao Nishimura, the director-general of the Ministry of Foreign

46

Id.
See e.g., LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 35, (citing NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPŌGAKU I
[CONSTITUTION STUDY] 257 (1992); and KOKUSAI HŌ [INTERNATIONAL LAW] (Kisaburo Yokota
ed., New ed. 1966).
48
See e.g., LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 3 n.5 (listing examples of scholars who
believe that Article 9 prohibits defensive engagements) (citing MIYOKO TSUJIMURA, KENPŌ
[CONSTITUTION] 108 (2000)).
49
See LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 2.
50
Id.
51
Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Showa 34(A) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Japan) (“In conjunction with the spirit of international cooperation
expressed in the Preamble and paragraph 2, Article 98 of the Constitution, [Article 9] is the
embodiment of the concept of pacifism which characterizes the Japanese Constitution.”),
https://perma.cc/Y4VH-EBWQ.
47
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Affairs’ Treaty Bureau in the 1950s, explained that Japan does possess a self-defense right but, under
Article 9, it waived that right.52 Since then, Japan remained consistent in its interpretation of Article
9. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) is the “office that created the legal theory underlying the
government’s interpretation of the Constitution and has kept that interpretation consistent.”53 As the
Law Library of Congress explains, “One of the reasons that the CLB has been able to maintain
consistent interpretations of Japan’s laws, despite political pressures, is its stable personnel system.”54
Because of the stable personnel system of the CLB, Article 9 has, for the most part, retained the
same interpretation until Prime Minister Abe’s recent reinterpretation. In fact, in 1965 the CLB
“determined that Article [9] would not prohibit possession of nuclear weapons by Japan, so long as
such weapons met the ‘minimum necessary’ requirement.”55 Further, Nakasone Yasuhiro, thendirector of the Japanese Defense Agency (“JDA) “opined in a 1970 White Paper that small-yield,
tactical, purely defensive nuclear weapons would be permissible under Article [9].”56 “Successive
administrations have reinforced the CLB interpretation by consistently declaring that Article [9] does
not prohibit the possession of nuclear weapons,” acknowledging the distinction between defensive
and offensive nuclear weapons as relevant to the analysis of Article 9.57
Relatedly, Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits the Japanese government from undertaking
a “use of force.”58 In 1991, the government explained that a “use of force” is “an act of combat by

52

See id. at 22 (citing Kumao Nishimura’s answer at House of Councillors, PEACE TREATY AND
JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY AGREEMENT SPECIAL COMMITTEE MINUTES, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, 12th
Diet Session, No. 12, 5 (Nov. 7, 1951)).
53
LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 16.
54
Id.
55
Robert Johnson, Japan Closes the Nuclear Umbrella: An Examination of Nonviolent Pacifism and Japan’s
Vision for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, 13 ASIAN-PAC L. & POL’Y J. 81, 83–84 (2012) (internal
citations omitted).
56
Id. (internal citations omitted).
57
Id. (internal citations omitted).
58
KENPŌ, supra note 2, art. 9, para. 1.
9
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an organization consisting of Japanese people carried out with materials provided by Japan and is
part of an international armed conflict."59 This interpretation is consistent with the CLB’s position.
Given that political decisions, as opposed to court rulings, seem to be the relevant currency
for changing Article 9, one may wonder whether this is constitutionally problematic, as Article 81 of
the Constitution grants the Supreme Court the “power to determine the constitutionality of any law,
order, regulation, or official act.”60 Indeed, this reinterpretation is highly problematic, as it essentially
bestows upon the executive branch the power to make law, while Article 41 mandates, “The Diet
shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.”61
Ultimately, such a debate is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to keep this in mind
while assessing the appropriateness of Prime Minister Abe’s actions.
c.

Nuclear Weapons Background and Logic

Nuclear weapons are among those classes of weapons that bring the average citizen great
fear. To governments, however, nuclear weapons are a symbol of power; all “great nations” possess
them, all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council possess them and, therefore,
many states who desire to become a “great nation” would like to acquire nuclear weapons.62
Most importantly for the purposes of this argument, nuclear weapons have a substantial
deterrent effect. The idea of deterrence is simple: A state uses the threat of force to convince another
state not to pursue an action it may otherwise consider.63 In order for deterrence to function, the

59

LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 21 (internal citations omitted).
KENPŌ, supra note 2, art. 81.
61
Id. art. 41.
62
See e.g., Karsten Frey, Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making, IBEI
WORKING PAPERS 9 (2006), (arguing that states desire nuclear weapons not only because of their
deterrent function, but also because they are symbols of prestige for developed nations),
https://perma.cc/L8PT-75VH; Maria Rivas, The Nuclear Weapon as a Symbol, BRITISH AMERICAN
SECURITY INFORMATION COUNCIL (June 24, 2014), https://perma.cc/3GRV-PAEA.
63
See SEAN KAY, GLOBAL SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 25 (2d ed. 2012).
60
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threat must be plausible.64 Deterrence has been so successful over the past seven decades that
people often trivialize its inconspicuous effect. Professors Keir Lieber and Daryl Press explain, “The
success of nuclear deterrence may turn out to be its own undoing. [A]fter nearly 65 years without a
major war or a nuclear attack, many prominent statesmen, scholars, and analysts have begun to take
deterrence for granted.”65 The fear of mutually assured destruction allowed for states to carry on,
knowing that another state would not take any rash actions, for fear of nuclear retaliation.66
However, recent cries for “nuclear zero” may undo the careful balance of power that mutually
assured destruction provides.67
Before a state can worry about human rights, public goods, or anything for that matter, it
must be assured that its regime will survive.68 Internally, a state must be able to quell any dissent and,
externally, it must be able to maintain its borders.69 As Kenneth Waltz explains in his book, Theory of
International Politics, “A government, ruling by some standard of legitimacy, arrogates to itself the
right to use force . . . A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is.”70

64

Id. at 25–26. A relevant example of this regards Japan’s potential threats to China. At the moment,
China may not believe a Japanese threat, given that Japan lacks nuclear weapons or its own large
military force. However, were Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, their threats would become
credible, and they could deter China from attacking. See e.g., 62% of South Koreans View Japan as
Credible Military Threat, THE AM. INTEREST (Nov. 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/2Y8M-BVGJ.
65
Keir A. Lieber & Daryl G. Press, The Nukes We Need, Preserving the American Deterrent, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2011), https://perma.cc/4KVB-HM3A.
66
Id.
67
Professor Charles Glaser argues: “Because nuclear arsenals could be rebuilt, much of the effort in
establishing a disarmament regime would involve designing arrangements to provide states with
confidence that they would be secure in the disarmed world. The most obvious requirement is that
cheating be effectively monitored. However, effective monitoring would not be sufficient.” Charles
L. Glaser, The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament, 40 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POLITICS AND STRATEGY,
no. 1, at 114 (1998). Glaser continues, “If one country can rebuild faster than others, then it could
have incentives to rebuild, even if monitoring were highly effective. Disarmament would therefore
have to be designed to enable states to rearm at essentially equal rates.” Id. Cf. Gordon Lubold,
Obama to outline big nuke cuts today, FOREIGN POLICY (June 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/P4JB-L3CF.
68
See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 103–04 (1979).
69
Id.
70
Id.
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However, in striving to survive, states often feel insecure when they see another state
arming.71 This “security dilemma” is compounded by the fact that, during a period of armament, one
state often fails to understand why another state arms.72 The first state may perceive the second
state’s arming to be offensive when, in reality, it is a response to the second state’s own security
concerns.73 This failure to understand the reasons for which another state arms is called the
fundamental attribution error, and it can lead to a sense of insecurity and fear.74
Two main schools of international political theory grapple with the security dilemma as the
core of international conflicts: defensive realists and offensive realists. The defensive realist assumes
all states arm defensively, eliminating the security dilemma.75 This framework allows for more
predictability, as intentions are undoubtedly understood.76 However, for the offensive realist, it is
unclear whether states arm offensively or defensively.77 Differentiating between these two modalities
can be difficult, as a state may only express its true plan when its power peaks.78 When a state is
uncertain whether it could achieve its desired outcome, it may not express its full intentions.79

71

See John H. Herz, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, 2 WORLD POL. 157, 157 (1950)
(“Striving to attain security from attack, [states] are driven to acquire more and more power in order
to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and
compels them to prepare for the worst.”).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Psychologists Halpern and Voiskounsky explain that the fundamental attribution error tends to
exacerbate matters “by lowering the perceptual threshold for attributing hostile intentions to other
states.” DIANE HALPBERN & ALEKSANDR VOISKOUNSKY, STATES OF MIND: AMERICAN AND POSTSOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN PSYCHOLOGY 54 (1997). Halpbern and
Voikounsky continue, “This tendency—in conjunction with the security dilemma—can lead
decision makers to exaggerate the hostile intentions of defensively motivated powers. The security
dilemma compels even peaceful states to arm; the fundamental attribution error then leads observers
to draw incorrect dispositional inferences.” Id.
75
See WALTZ, supra note 68, at 103–04.
76
Id.
77
See generally JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 17–22 (2d Ed.
2014) (comparing liberalist, offensive realist, and defensive realist theories).
78
Id.
79
Id.
12
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Often, it is defensive realists who see nuclear weapons as peace-inducing.80 For the defensive
realist, nuclear arming is assumed to be defensive and, therefore, the security dilemma vanishes as
one’s own insecurity does not mount upon seeing another country arm.81 However, for the offensive
realist, the security dilemma intensifies, and it does so especially strongly regarding nuclear
weapons.82 For the offensive realist, proliferation is dangerous, as it creates insecurity in the
international system, and other countries will react to armament in order to provide for their own
security.83 The circumstances in Japan are unique as, given that Japan existed without a strong
military presence for so long, other states may perceive any armament as offensive and expansionist
when, in reality, Japan is simply responding to increasing security concerns in Asia.84
Unlike conventional forces, nuclear weapons are unique because offensive weapons can be
distinguished from defensive weapons.85 For instance, a nuclear weapon that has the ability to hit a
precise mark is offensive, while an imprecise weapon is defensive.86 Precision allows targeting of
another country’s nuclear stockpile, and by targeting the stockpile, one can destroy the enemy’s
ability to retaliate, therefore conducting an offensive first-strike.87 Defensive weapons are imprecise,
counter-value weapons that only have the ability to strike large economic areas, as opposed to
nuclear stockpiles.88 Ultimately, nuclear technology favors defensive use, as it is difficult to produce
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precision weapons.89 By acquiring a small number of inaccurate weapons, a state can use strategies of
deterrence to soothe its own security concerns, without other countries fearing an offensive strike.90
In the case of Japan seeing a rising China, it is rational for Japan to feel insecure. In order to
alleviate their insecurity, Japan currently possesses a complete security and extended deterrence
agreement with the United States, which provides for Japan’s defense in the case of an attack.91
However, as China’s power rises, it is reasonable for Japan to question the sustainability of the
security agreement.92 For the U.S., it is exceedingly costly to ensure Japan’s security in the face of a
rising China—the upkeep of military bases in Japan may cost as much at $5.5 billion per year.93 As
China’s conventional force size grows, the United States will need to grow their force size to keep
89
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See CHARLES L. GLASER, ANALYZING NUCLEAR STRATEGY 95 (1990).
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See Richard C. Bush, The U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views, and
Implications 3–4 (2011), https://perma.cc/6JUD-GU3E; Peace Treaty, supra note 23, 3 U.S.T. 3169;
Security Treaty, supra note 24, 3 U.S.T. 3329. See also Van Jackson, Raindrops Keep Falling on my Nuclear
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Weapons Budget: An Overview (Sept. 27, 2013), https://perma.cc/8859-2WMN. Yet, these updates are
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up.94 Particularly because of various territorial disputes, the United States could be drawn into an
armed conflict in East Asia.95 The current strategy is too costly, and by allowing proliferation in
Japan, the U.S. will not need to increase its force size to mimic China’s. If Japan were to acquire its
own weapons, it would be able to use deterrence to come to a resolution of disputes itself, and while
the United States could provide assistance through diplomacy, it would not be militarily required to
defend Japan.
d.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Given the consequences of the Cold War, international law adapted itself to regulate nuclear
weapons and nuclear aggression. Even today, questions surrounding the Iranian nuclear program
permeate the headlines of various news sources, suggesting the continued relevance and fear of
nuclear weapons.96 States responded to these fears through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of
1968.97 The treaty, consisting of 190 parties, relies on three pillars: (1) non-proliferation, (2)
disarmament, and (3) the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.98 As a signatory and ratifying
party,99 Japan is obliged not to breach the NPT.100
The requirement of non-proliferation is only applicable to the five recognized nuclear
weapons states (NWS): China, France, the Soviet Union (with obligations inherited by Russia), the
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United Kingdom, and the United States.101 These states are obligated not to “transfer . . . nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices [nor] . . . in any way assist, encourage, or induce” a nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) to acquire such weapons.102 Similarly, NNWS “ undertake[] not to
receive the transfer . . . of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly, or indirectly;
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons . . . and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.”103
The second requirement, disarmament, is perhaps the only binding portion of the treaty.104
The wording of Article VI is vague, requiring that signatories move in the general direction of
disarmament and “nuclear zero”: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty of general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control.”105 Given that Japan does not currently possess
nuclear weapons, it has no duty to disarm. This requirement, however, does place an affirmative
duty upon Japan not to obtain nuclear weapons prospectively.106 While some countries view this
language as vague, the International Court of Justice authoritatively determined that, “There exists
an obligation [under Article VI] to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations
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leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,” and
this requirement applies to both NWS and NNWS.107
The third pillar is the peaceful use of nuclear energy.108 Article IV states, “All the Parties to
the Treaty . . . have the right to participate in[] the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials
and scientific and technology information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”109 Despite the
disaster in Fukushima, nobody questions whether Japan is within the bounds of Article IV of the
NPT.110
One might believe that the NPT would limit Japan’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons. The
first pillar restricts Japan from receiving nuclear weapons—however, this requirement is likely
aspirational and non-binding.111 The second pillar requires all member states to negotiate an
agreement in good faith.112 But nobody doubts that countries are working toward this goal. Finally,
the third permits Japan to use nuclear energy.113 Even assuming that the prohibition against the
transfer of nuclear weapons were binding, the NPT would not pose an issue because, as discussed
below, it would be easy for Japan to withdraw from international agreements prohibiting it from
obtaining nuclear weapons,114 and other countries likely will accept Japan’s retreat, potentially
creating new customary international law.115 Yet, it is clear that Japan is obliged under the NPT to
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not proliferate—whether Japan will continue to follow international law, or whether it will choose to
break international law in the hopes of creating new customary norms is a different question.
III.

JAPAN COULD CONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAIN DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS INSTEAD OF ENGAGING IN COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE, AND
SHOULD, BECAUSE IT IS MORE IN TUNE WITH ITS CITIZENS’ PACIFIST
DESIRES AND BECAUSE OTHER COUNTRIES WILL ACQUIESCE
Japan’s new interpretation of Article 9 allows the country to obtain defensive nuclear

weapons. As compared to maintaining a standing military to engage in collective security, acquisition
of defensive nuclear weapons should be normatively preferable to Japan, as they would help in
stabilizing the region as well as in calming the concerns of its citizens that, with a standing military,
Japan would again become an international aggressor. Nuclear weapons would be a force of good
for Japan and greater Asia, and would serve the United States’s greater geopolitical interests as well.
a.

Japan Could Constitutionally Obtain Defensive Nuclear Weapons

Both under the old interpretation of Article 9 and under Prime Minister Abe’s new
interpretation, Japan could constitutionally obtain defensive nuclear weapons. Given the large-scale
pushback against the new interpretation of Article 9,116 the current government may normatively
prefer to acquire such weapons under the standards of the old interpretation. Nonetheless, even
under the new interpretation, which allows for collective self-defense, acquisition of defensive
nuclear weapons would quell the concerns of the citizens and would be preferable.
Japan’s Constitution has no affirmative prohibition against nuclear weapons.117 The portion
of the Constitution that could preclude nuclear proliferation is Article 9, the prohibition against “war
potential.”118 Yet, no Japanese court decision considered the constitutionality of nuclear weapons
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because, like in the United States, Japanese courts only review cases and controversies and, given
that Japan never had nuclear weapons, nobody challenged such an acquisition.119
While arguments exist on both sides for whether nuclear proliferation would be
constitutional, it is clear that obtaining nuclear weapons would be at least as permissible as
expanding ground forces to engage in collective security. Given the nature of cases challenging the
SDF,120 Prime Minister Abe’s plan to expand self-defense forces is likely unconstitutional. But, even
if Abe’s assertions were indeed unconstitutional, this would not be dispositive of the
constitutionality of nuclear weapons. Whereas self-defense forces could be seen as “war potential,”
defensive nuclear weapons are just the opposite. They are strictly responsive, never meant to
provoke, and they would not initiate war, but defend against it. While the Constitution itself may
even preclude attacks taken in self-defense,121 this view has been poorly received and even, under
this view, one can reason that defensive nuclear weapons function as defensive insurance against
other states’ offensive attacks, not as an attack taken out of self-defense.
b.

Japan’s Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons Would Violate the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, However, Other Countries Would Likely Acquiesce

Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would almost certainly violate its international
obligations under the NPT, as Japan is non-nuclear weapons state ratifying party; however, given
that the U.S. would save a large amount of money by reducing troops in the region, and NATO
member states would welcome an Asian nation gaining membership, they may acquiesce to Japan’s
nuclear acquisition. First, it is important to recall that, under Japan’s treaty obligations, it is able to
act for the purposes of self-defense, and its decision to limit its “war potential” is a wholly domestic
119
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decision without repercussions for international law.122 Therefore, we must consider whether the
acquisition of nuclear weapons would violate international law—not domestic law.
Not only is Japan an NNWS ratifying party of the NPT, but it is also a signatory of a
number of other international commitments in the broader non-proliferation regime, which would
preclude it from acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, Japan is a state party to the Additional
Protocol of the NPT which, “[S]ignificantly expands [Japan’s] reporting responsibility to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) and enables inspections of declared and suspected
undeclared sites at short notice.”123 Additionally, Japan is a state-party to the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (“CTBT”).124 Although the CTBT has not yet entered into force, it prohibits state parties
from “conducting any nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and establishes a
comprehensive worldwide verification regime to monitor compliance.”125 Despite the fact that the
CTBT has not entered into force, Japan, as a signatory, is bound not to violate the object and
purpose of the treaty,126 and one could argue that acquisition of nuclear weapons would violate the
object and purpose.127 Finally, Japan has bilateral nuclear energy agreements with the United States,
122
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the United Kingdom, France, China and Australia.128 In these agreements, the aforementioned
countries provide the necessary materials for the nuclear fuel cycle, while Japan agrees to use such
equipment only for non-military purposes.129 Importantly, “[W]ere Japan to violate any of these
agreements, sanctions would be severe and would include immediate return of all materials and
equipment to the supplying country. Japan would then be blocked from world supplies of natural
and enriched uranium and related equipment.”130 This could be devastating for Japan’s economy
and, therefore, Japan would need to act thoughtfully and purposefully in determining whether to
breach such treaties. Yet, were the countries with which Japan had these bilateral agreements to
allow Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, there would be no such devastation.
Recently, scholars have criticized the efficacy of the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime, particularly given that India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are not member states of
many relevant international agreements.131 As professor David Jonas argues, the nonproliferation
regime will not survive without these countries as members.132 Legally, it would not be difficult for
Japan to leave the NPT, as it requires only providing three months’ notice and a showing that,
“[E]xtraordinary events . . . have jeopardized [Japan’s] supreme interests.”133 The requirements to
withdraw from the CTBT are identical, except a state party must provide six months’ notice instead
of three.134 Therefore, were Japan to desire nuclear weapons, it could easily withdraw from the
international agreements that bind it in order to acquire them.
Despite the fact that Japan’s acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons would violate its
international treaty obligations (unless it were to withdraw, in which case it may still violate
128
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customary international law), a variety of countries will likely acquiesce to the procurement,
potentially forming new, binding customary international law. It is unclear whether the proliferation
of defensive nuclear weapons would even violate customary international law; the International
Court of Justice has not passed judgment on this question.135 In the ICJ case, Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court unanimously held, “A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also
be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable to armed conflict particularly
those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific
obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons.”136
However, by a vote of seven to seven with the President casting his vote for the majority, “It
follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”137 The Court continued, “However in the view of the
current state of international law . . . the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”138 The case of Japan could very well be such an
“extreme circumstance” where the survival of Japan “would be at stake.” Or, this case may not even
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provide guidance, as it does not acknowledge the difference between defensive and offensive
weapons, which could affect the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.
As discussed below, the United States should accept Japanese proliferation, because it will
save the U.S. money and allow the U.S. more freedom of maneuver in its Asian foreign policy.139 But
not only should the U.S. acquiesce so too should other similarly situated members of the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). NATO has long desired to
expand into Asia.140 Some consider NATO expansion to be a key reason for the Russian
intervention in the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, as Russia feared a NATO encroachment.141
Currently, Japan, along with Australia, Mongolia, and some other Asian nations are “global partners”
of NATO, but not members—no Asian country is a member.142 By allowing Japan to acquire
defensive nuclear weapons and to become a full member of NATO, NATO could begin its goal of
Asian expansion to provide global stability, with Japan being the first of such members.
c.

Japan Should Prefer Obtaining Nuclear Weapons to Engaging in Collective SelfDefense, as the Defensive Weapons Will Help to Stabilize the Region and Quell the
Fears of Japanese Citizens Who Oppose Military Expansion
i.

Japan should prefer obtaining nuclear weapons as opposed to expanding its
ground forces, as it will help to stabilize the region

Japan faces numerous contemporaneous regional conflicts, and by obtaining nuclear
weapons, Japan could broker a peaceful resolution between itself and other Asian states. Currently,
there exists a dispute regarding claims to the Senkaku (Japanese name)/Daiyou (Chinese name)
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Islands in the East China Sea.143 Without going into all of the intricacies of the law of the sea, the
dispute is as follows: both Japan and China make claims to these seven square kilometer islands, as
jurisdiction over the islands would allow for extended rights to fishing and natural resources in the
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) under the rules of United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.144 Neither country maintains a particularly strong historical claim to the Islands,145 which makes
the determination of who properly retains jurisdiction difficult. Under UNCLOS, a country may
only extend its EEZ based on its jurisdiction over islands, not over “rock which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life on their own.146 These islands are so small that, according to
some experts, they are only rocks, in which case neither Japan nor China could extend its EEZ.147
President Obama refuses to comment on whether the land masses constitute islands.148
Presumptively, both Japan and China consider these land masses to be islands, otherwise
they would not be in such a heated battle, each assuming that it will be able to extend its EEZ if it
gains control. But China refuses to negotiate.149 China asserts similar claims over island chains in the
143
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South China Sea without negotiating.150 China feels no incentive to negotiate, as its power relative to
the countries who also assert claims to these island chains (Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam,
Indonesia, etc.) is very strong. In fact, China’s refusal to arbitrate ownership of the islands is in
direct breach of UNCLOS.151 Given China’s lack of willingness to comply with international
obligations and China’s manifestation of power as a means of settling international disputes, Japan’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons would balance China’s power and ensure the continued relevance
and implementation of international agreements governing disputes in Asia.
Some may argue that acquisition of defensive nuclear weapons may not actually help Japan
feel more secure in its strategic position—defensive nuclear weapons would not allow Japan to exert
affirmative force on other countries to act—they would only allow responsive measures should
Japan be threatened. However, this argument misses a key element of the solution: acquisition of
defensive nuclear weapons could help bring Japan into the fold of NATO to become the first Asian
member-state.152 The acquisition of nuclear weapons, plus the eventual accession into NATO will
help Japan become a stabilizing force in the region, during a time when tensions run high as China
continues to rise.
ii.

Japan should prefer obtaining nuclear weapons as opposed to expanding its
ground forces, as it is more in line with the general pacifist public opinion

Not only would defensive nuclear weapons be normatively preferable to Japan as compared
to collective self-defense forces because defensive nuclear weapons will stabilize the region, but they
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are also preferable because they will calm citizens’ fears of Japan becoming an international
aggressor through an expanded military. As explored above, a large proportion of Japanese citizens
believe that Japan should exercise its right to self-defense to a limited extent.153 However, the
citizenry fears that collective self-defense forces would allow Japan to revert to the international
aggressor it was during World War II, as the government could send troops anywhere in the world
without public input, straying away from Japan’s pacifist disposition.154 Given the strong public
backlash against Prime Minister Abe’s unilateral reinterpretation of the Constitution,155 defensive
nuclear proliferation could both provide the collective defense that the Prime Minister desires, while
responding to the cries of pacifism from the citizenry. According to CNN, “Opponents of the
legislation say seven decades of Japanese postwar pacifism are simply being tossed away without
proper public debate or discourse. [They] worry about the consequences of potentially sending
troops into battle without actual combat experience.”156 Proliferation solves these dual concerns: (1)
abandoning Japan’s pacifist foreign policy and (2) a lack of military preparedness. Defensive nuclear
weapons present a more pacifist, deterrence-based policy than collective self-defense forces.
Japan certainly retains a right to self-defense.157 However, Japan’s Constitution prohibits the
government from maintaining ground forces; in fact, it is unclear whether it would even be
constitutional for a citizen’s militia to form were an attack to occur.158 Many scholars argue that the
national right of self-defense emanates from Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.159 As Article
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51 states, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs . . . until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”160 Japan’s continued self-defense policies are important,
but they must take into account the citizens’ clear cries for pacifism.
A major concern for those opposing Japanese proliferation is that proliferation is not
pacifist. Yet, “pacifism,” as a concept, exists along a spectrum. Some argue that Japan would never
opt to obtain nuclear weapons because of Japanese reticence towards nuclear power after the
Fukushima disaster and because the U.S. opposes Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons.161 And
some reiterate that Japan is the only country to experience a nuclear attack, and the fallout of that
attack is still ingrained in the minds of its citizens.162 In any case, the better solution is to view
nuclear proliferation as a compromise between the government’s proposal and the citizens’ cries—
nuclear proliferation may not be wholly pacifist but, as discussed below, it is more pacifist than
collective self-defense forces and, therefore, is an option more true to Japan’s pacifist ethos.
Not unsurprisingly, a large source of the anger toward Prime Minister Abe is from the
Japanese citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki—the only two cities in the world to have actually felt
the power and fallout of a nuclear attack.163 Former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama stands by
the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in their aversion to nuclear weapons: “Those in Hiroshima
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and Nagasaki suffered the first atomic bombs. People know these things well—that is why we made
a vow that we will not repeat the same mistake.”164 The historical memory of those living where the
attacks occurred is a concern in advocating for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. But by acquiring
exclusively defensive nuclear weapons, Japan will ensure that such an experience never occurs again,
instead of leaving itself defenseless, as it currently stands.
While on their face nuclear weapons may not appear pacifist, the acquisition of nuclear
weapons can cohere with a pacifist policy. Black’s Law Dictionary defines pacifism as “The
advocacy of peaceful methods rather than war as a means of solving disputes.”165 Further, Black’s
acknowledges that the concept of “armed peace” is possible as “a situation in which two or more
countries, while at peace, are actually armed for possible or probable hostilities.”166 While not pacifist
by nature, defensive nuclear weapons are consistent with Japan’s pacifistic objectives, where (1) all
attempts are made to solve conflicts peaceably first; and (2) weapons are employed only to defend
oneself from another state’s aggression. Whereas collective self-defense forces retain the ability to
travel anywhere in the world and affirmatively launch invasions, defensive nuclear weapons are
exclusively responsive, and can only ensure Japan’s continue security without the possibility of
undertaking an expansionist regime. The keystone of Japan’s foreign policy will be deterrence, and
history has demonstrated that defensive nuclear weapons further this goal.
Importantly, the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons under the constraints of Article 9 is not
novel. As early as 1965, only two decades after the drafting of the Constitution, the CLB determined
that the possession of nuclear weapons would not run counter to the prohibition against war
potential under Article 9.167 Further, “Successive administrations have reinforced the CLB
164
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interpretation by consistently declaring that Article [9] does not prohibit the possession of nuclear
weapons,” reminding that the distinction between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons remains
relevant to an analysis of the prohibitions under Article 9.168
A further problem for Japan in creating collective security forces as compared to nuclear
weapons is the cost. The price to refurbish an existing nuclear weapon would be approximately $2
million, while Japan spends upwards of $4 billion per year on maintenance of U.S. bases and the
SDF.169 This figure would only expand were Japan to engage in collective security. This fiscal
concern should lead both the U.S. and Japan to seriously consider proliferation of defensive nuclear
weapons as a viable alternative. Therefore, both in terms of finances and popular support, Japan
should acquire defensive nuclear weapons as opposed to creating collective self-defense forces.
d.

Japanese Acquisition of Defensive Nuclear Weapons Is in the United States’s
Geopolitical Interest

Given that the U.S. provides for Japan’s defense, and this is costly for the U.S., it would be
in the U.S.’s international political interest to find a way to disentangle itself from Japan’s security so
that it can save money while ensuring Japan’s continued economic and political success. Recently,
Japan sought to cut spending on U.S. military bases in Japan to lower government expenditures.170
Concurrently, there are strong domestic pressures in the U.S. counseling government to cut defense
168
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spending.171 While the U.S. does not spend an exorbitant amount of money in absolute terms (some
$526.8 million in 2014) the spending is used in the operation of its bases in Japan, particularly in
Okinawa.172 There is also strong Japanese resistance to the continued maintenance of the U.S. base
in Okinawa.173
While reduction in spending is certainly a motivating factor for an American acceptance of
Japanese proliferation, so too should the U.S. feel comfortable in this decision, because it will help
disentangle the U.S. from contentious disputes in Asia. Given that the U.S. provides for Japan’s
defense, Japan may be constrained in its foreign policy.174 This means that the U.S. has a strong
interest in Japan’s geopolitical strategy, but also that the U.S. feels compelled not to allow Japan to
act against the U.S.’s interests regarding other nations. For example, while the U.S. currently takes a
neutral approach to its interactions with Taiwan,175 a politically independent Japan with deterrent
capabilities could negotiate with China to change the geopolitical arrangements of East Asia.
Another situation where the U.S. would benefit from Japanese autonomy would be in the
aforementioned disputes over islands in the South and East China Seas.176 Presumably, the U.S. does
not want to become entangled in long-term negotiations regarding the geographic boundaries of
Asian nations under UNCLOS in which the U.S. lacks any stake, fearing that the world community
171
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would view decisions taken by Japanese leadership as attributable to the United States. Therefore, by
allowing Japanese proliferation, the U.S. would empower Japan to engage in negotiations, without
the U.S. having to fend off Japan’s adversaries. Ultimately, allowing Japanese proliferation is in the
best interest of the United States, both permitting a reduction in U.S. military spending, and
empowering Japan to make its own foreign policy decisions without deep U.S. entrenchment.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Where the Japanese government fears for its safety and the Japanese public clings to its

pacifist roots, we see an interesting and pressing dilemma. Proliferation of defensive nuclear
weapons will be the most effective means for Japan to quell its fears under the security dilemma,
while simultaneously responding to the unease expressed by the Japanese populace of a full military
armament, because it will provide security while encouraging pacifism—understanding the aversion
to a large standing collective self-defense force, albeit still defensive in orientation. Moreover, the
U.S. will see this solution as favorable, as it will allow the U.S. to reduce defense spending in
attempts to demonstrate to the international community that the future will entail a less
interventionist foreign policy after the disasters in the Middle East of the early twenty-first century.
Additionally, nuclear weapons will stabilize East Asia, as Japan will balance China’s power in
negotiations on hot issues, such as the Senkaku/Daiyou Island dispute in the East China Sea.177
Even those who find this argument normatively preferable may question the feasibility of
such an arrangement, citing the strong international norms against proliferation and many regimes’
stated goals of “nuclear zero.”178 While nuclear zero may be an aspirational ideal, it is not in many
states’ best interest, as governments often take for granted the fact that nuclear weapons have
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provided international stability for decades.179 Nuclear zero is also unfeasible, because states cannot
“un-learn” how to produce nuclear weapons; the best that nuclear zero would do is extend a
country’s breakout time before being able to launch an attack.180 To that end, the whole rationale
behind nuclear weapons—providing long-term, deterrent stability because other countries know that
you have the capacity to attack—would be undermined in a nuclear zero world.
Consequently, given that nuclear weapons already exist, the best option is to use them for
stability, not to ban them with the hopes that everyone will abide by the ban. If the Japanese were to
acquire nuclear weapons, it would ease the government’s security dilemma without inciting the
massive backlash that expanded collective self-defense forces would provoke. Not only is this a
good option for Japan, but it is also in the U.S.’s strategic interest, as it could save large sums of
money on defense spending and disentangle the U.S. from contentious disputes in Asia. This
proposed solution is feasible, practical, and respects the complicated history and adherence toward
pacifism of the Japanese people. Finally, despite the fact that acquisition of defensive nuclear
weapons may violate international law, it is in many states’ best interest to allow Japanese
proliferation, and these states should quickly acquiesce to a Japanese nuclear acquisition.
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